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The latter 1970s, especially following the passage of
Proposition 13 in California, brought renewed interest in
property taxes as a method'of financing local public ser-
vices. Discussions about property taxes have focused on
burden and, more recently, on various forms of taxpayer
relief. Limits on levies'or increases in tax base have been
imposed in some states. Such limits are met with major
opposition by local government officials who claim that
the rising costs of local public services are already plac-
ing considerable pressure on local resources, and further
limitations will only worsen the situation.
In Illinois, as in most states, local public services can
be provided through a wide variety of governmental struc-
tures Residents in some regions of the state receive vir-
tually all their services from general purpose governments,
whereas, in other areas, special districts are quite im-
portant. Since each of these types of government has its
special way of obtaining revenues, the amount of property
tax collected may be quite different. Moreover, residents
desiring additional services may find that certain govern-
mental structures offer greater input into decisions about
the level of services provided and, therefore, the amount
of revenue that must be raised. Finally, the same aggregate
expenditure can be financed from many different revenue
sources, one of which is the property tax. Thus, it is not
unlikely that two counties with the same aggregate expendi-
ture for services would have very different property tax
collections. One of the significant factors accounting for
these differences is the governmental structure
This paper seeks to shed light on the role that govern-
mental structure plays in property tax collections, using
1977 Census of Governments data for Illinois counties.
No attempt is made to justify or critique certain types of
government as being more efficient or preferable to others.
Rather, the concern here is whether more complex delivery
systems lead to higher property taxes and, if so, how much
higher. This paper is organized into two parts. The first
section discusses recent changes in government struc-
ture, some of the reasons for these changes, and their im-
plications for local finance. The second section reports
an empirical analysis of determinants of property tax col-
lections.
A MULTITUDE OF GOVERNMENTAL TYPES
In 1977. the U.S. Bureau of the Census counted 6,620 units
of government in Illinois, of which 5,522 could levy prop-
erty taxes. This number compares with 5,246 local govern-
ments in Pennsylvania, the state with the second largest
number, of which 3,282 had property taxing powers. A
profile of Illinois governments is provided in Table 1 with
a comparison of changes between 1962 and 1977 During
this fifteen-year period, two main trends occurred First,
as the result of a massive consolidation effort, there was
a 31 percent decrease in the number of school districts,
from 1.540 in 1 962 to 1,063 in 1977.
Table 1
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ILLINOIS
Types of Governments 1962 1977
Percent
Change
Counties
A second, and more important trend for present pur-
poses, was the 29.5 percent increase in the number of
special districts, from 2.126 in 1962 to 2,745 in 1977 A
brief inspection of the increases, by type of district, reveals
major differences in growth patterns The greatest per-
centage increase was in utility districts, but, in absolute
numbers, the major growth occurred in fire protection and
park districts. More specifically. 150 fire protection dis-
tricts and 142 park and recreation districts were added.
Sewerage districts and library districts also increased
markedly.
Statewide, the net increase in number of governments
during the fifteen-year period ending in 1977 was only
2.6 percent, because the decrease in school districts
was largely offset by the increase in special districts
Had the reduction in school districts not occurred, the
growth in number of governments would have been nearly
30 percent
Comparing numbers of governments can be misleading,
since larger states usually have more units A clearer
picture is obtained by comparing Illinois with other states
using ratio of governments to population. In Illinois, for
instance, there was one government for each 1,691 resi-
dents. Rather than having the most governments per resi-
dent, Illinois ranks about seventeenth among states. Not
unexpectedly, rural states have more government frag-
mentation North Dakota, for example, has one govern-
ment for each 235 residents At the other extreme, Alaska
reported one government for each 45,684 residents. Over-
all, the national average was one government for each
2,668 residents based on total number of governments,
including those without property taxing powers.
Of course, statewide averages of government ratios
do not capture intrastate differences. Cook County con-
tained one government for each 9,692 residents while
Iroquois County, in eastern Illinois, contained one govern-
ment for every 191 residents. In some instances, multiple
districts overlap a city. Thus, Springfield residents are
served by fifteen independent or semi-independent gov-
ernments. Residents in one Chicago suburb of 13,000 are
served by sixteen separate governments, including multiple
school districts and townships.
Reasons for Special Districts
Why has there been such a proliferation in the number of
special districts in Illinois during the past fifteen years?
One explanation commonly proposed in the past suggested
that it is due to an attempt to escape state-imposed tax
and debt limits. When general purpose governments
reach taxing and debt limits, a new unit of government with
its own taxing limits is created.
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Providing services through special districts offers several
advantages to certain residents. First, those interested
in a specific service do not have to compete with other
services for budgetary consideration. The effective limit
on services provided is the amount of money that can be
collected from property taxes or other revenue sources.
Second, a special district providing a specific service
allows interested residents to monitor more closely the
services provided and to tailor programs to their liking
Interested residents can serve on the governing board
with a relatively small commitment of time and effort but
with a significant impact on services provided. Such service
also offers residents an opportunity to participate in
government, gain prestige in the community, and perhaps
advance their careers in the private sector. Businesses
value participation by their employees in public affairs
and often count these activities toward promotion
Third, special districts permit extension of services
beyond the boundaries of general purpose governments.
Rural residents desiring fire protection can obtain services
through a fire protection district that includes a munici-
pality and the surrounding hinterland. The same is true
for sewerage treatment and disposal. In some instances,
particularly fire protection, a special district is virtually
the only way rural residents can finance services.
Finally, there may be some services with high fixed
costs which can only be provided effectively by reaching
a certain scale. Reaching this output size may require
provision of services to residents outside the limits of
a general purpose government. In the past, governments
experienced difficulty initiating cooperative arrangements,
and sometimes special authorizing legislation was re-
quired to implement these agreements In these cases,
special districts offer decided advantages. Along the
same lines, a claim can be made that inefficiency in the
provision of services is likely with smaller, more numerous
governments because budgets are not large enough to
pay well-qualified employees. Also, cost savings from
large purchases may be less likely. Because of data limi-
tations, however, research findings on this efficiency ques-
tion have been mixed.
If single function districts have the described advan-
tages, why have there been attempts to limit their use or
consolidate them? There are several situations in which
special districts, particularly those overlapping other
governments, experience limitations. First, as a city
increases in population size, its needs for services change.
Officials in a fire protection district that included a small
municipality when it was created, may find that twenty
years later city residents desire a full-service fire depart-
ment although rural residents do not
Second, a city may grow through annexations in such
a way that it is served not only by its own municipal fire
department but also by one or more special fire protec-
tion districts The outcome of this scenario is confusion
among residents about who provides which services and
to whom. Cost savings may be possible from a better
sharing of equipment and manpower in these instances.
There is also a view that a large number of small inde-
pendent governments makes voters less able to identify
which government is causing tax increases and, therefore,
less likely to hold public officials accountable For instance,
when small governments each levy a property tax. the
tax bill contains a multitude of tax rates; and, until recently,
taxpayers could not easily determine which districts
they were supporting. Moreover, since each special pur-
pose district represents a small part of the aggregate tax
bill, local officials are less reluctant to increase their levies.
SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND PROPERTY TAXES
In recent years, the property taxes collected by special
districts have been increasing more rapidly than thoseA collected by other governments. A comparison of growth
in aggregate property taxes collected by type of govern-
ment between 1974 and 1976. for example, shows that
taxes collected by special districts increased 24.3 percent
compared with 11.4 percent for cities, 13.6 percent for
counties. 15.1 percent for school districts, and 22.4 per-
cent for townships (including road districts).
Although the rate of increase for special districts may
have been greater than other governments, they remain a
relatively minor portion of the property tax collections
statewide. In 1977, for instance, special districts (exclud-
ing school districts) accounted for only 11.5 percent of
property tax collections in Illinois Over the past twenty
years, the proportion of taxes collected by special dis-
tricts has increased several percentage points.
To analyze the impact of governmental structure on the
collection of these property taxes, a least squares regres-
sion equation was estimated using 1977 Census of Govern-
ments data for all Illinois counties except Cook.
Based on the above discussion, it is now possible to
suggest several reasons why numbers of governments and
governmental structure might affect per capita property
tax collections. First is the limited number of revenue
sources available to certain government types. School
districts and townships depend heavily on property taxes,
while counties and municipalities are less reliant on this
revenue source. Cities, counties, and townships have
access to some intergovernmental revenue sources which
special districts do not. For the same aggregate expendi-
ture, one might expect areas with more special districts
to have higher property tax collections.
Secondly, if special districts in Illinois have been used
to circumvent property tax limitations, then areas with more
special districts could be expected to collect more property
taxes. Of course, in this case, the higher tax collections
could simply reflect additional services. About the only
practical way to adjust for services is to control for aggre-
gate per capita expenditures but this is only a gross esti-
mate of services provided.
Finally, if it is true that more governments levying property
taxes confuse residents and lead to less accountability,
then one could find areas with a larger number of govern-
ments having higher property tax collections.
To determine the impact of number of governments on
per capita property taxes collected in Illinois counties, the
following equation was estimated:
Ptax = a + bilNC + b 2IGR + baEXP + b4MFG + bsGOV
+ beAGE + b?SCH + u.
where:
Ptax = Per capita aggregate 1977 property tax receipts in
Illinois counties
INC = Per capita income in 1977
IGR = Per capita intergovernmental revenues
EXP = Aggregate per capita expenditures by local govern-
ments in the county
MFG = Percent of county employment in manufacturingGOV = Number of taxing units per 10,000 residents in the
county
AGE = Percent of residents 65 years and older
SCH = Percent of population enrolled in public schools
> 1977
The rationale for each variable in the equation is provided
as follows
— Per capita income was included to adjust for wealth
in a county. Residents in counties with higher per capita
incomes are better able, and may be more willing, to
pay property taxes to support desired services. For
high-income families, property taxes may represent
a more desirable method of financing services since
homes with high market value are known to be under-
assessed. Also, property taxes are deductible against
federal income taxes. Thus, one could easily find a
positive association between per capita property tax
receipts and income levels.*
— Percent of people 65 years and older was included to
test whether aged residents exert a limiting effect on
property taxes. It is commonly thought that retirees are
particularly hard hit by property taxes (although circuit
breakers have helped recently) and tend to resist tax
increases. Aged residents also do not need certain
local services, such as schools, which are heavily
financed by property taxes. Thus, one would expect a
negative association between property tax collections
and the percentage of aged residents.
— The number of elementary and secondary school
children enrolled in public schools, as a percent of the
county population, was included to adjust between
counties for demands placed on schools. Since schools
receive almost half of their revenues from property
taxes and account for nearly 60 percent of the property
taxes collected statewide, one would expect counties
with more students to have higher property tax collec-
tions.
— Comparisons of property tax collections across counties
necessitate adjustments for services provided. If no
attempt is made to correct for differences in services,
then higher property tax collections may simply reflect
more services. Since services are nearly impossible
to measure directly, per capita expenditures were in-
cluded as a proxy. For present purposes, the ratio of
local public employment to population was used to
replace per capita expenditures with similar results.
— The number of taxing units per 10,000 residents was
included to determine whether the number of govern-
ments providing services makes a difference with
respect to property tax collections. Using the arguments
outlined above, one would expect to find a positive
association between number of governments and per
capita property tax collections
— Per capita intergovernmental aid was included to test
the impact of this revenue source on property taxes
collected. One might hypothesize that additional inter-
governmental revenues allow local officials to lessen
their reliance on property taxes, especially when local
taxpayers resist these taxes. A priori, at least part of
additional intergovernmental support would be expected
to be used for property tax relief and a negative relation-
ship between this variable and property tax collections
is anticipated.
— For citizens and government officials alike, the op-
portunity to transfer a portion of the property tax burden
is very attractive. Thus, counties with relatively more of
their property tax base in commercial property might
be expected to have higher per capita property tax
collections Unfortunately, detailed information on as-
sessed valuation by class of property is not available
in Illinois so that a direct test of this proposition is nearly
• A more complete examination of the relationship between income and
property taxes in Illinois was recently reported by A James Hems in Illinois
Government Research. 51, available from the Institute of Government
and Public Affairs
Table 2
DETERMINANTS OF PROPERTY TAX COLLECTIONS
Per Capita Collections
